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WHEN PRIVACY FAILS: INVOKING A 
PROPERTY PARADIGM TO MANDATE THE 
DESTRUCTION OF DNA SAMPLES 
LEIGH M. HARLAN 
INTRODUCTION 
The maxim “innocent until proven guilty” has assumed 
significance in legal scholarship, colloquial conversation, and the 
media; indeed, the concept resonates with American society. Its 
prominence in popular and legal culture reflects society’s concern for 
balancing the constitutional guarantee of liberty with the 
government’s duty to secure the well-being of its citizens. The maxim 
recognizes the inherent collisions of constitutional law and criminal 
law, of rights and responsibilities, and of privacy and protection. In 
the very nature of these ideas is the notion that Americans respect—
and arguably require—laws that offer broad protection to society 
without eclipsing individual privacy. Recent scientific advances have 
afforded deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) a preeminent role in 
providing such protections; with the advent of cataloged genetic 
“fingerprints” that can be matched to cellular material left at crime 
scenes, the modern American criminal justice system has become 
increasingly efficient and significantly more accurate.1 Yet current 
law, which fails to mandate the destruction of voluntarily provided 
DNA samples, falls well short of providing genetic privacy to 
innocent individuals.2 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Leigh M. Harlan. 
 1. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 455, 462 (2001). 
 2. See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance 
Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 796 (1999) (“Although many statutes make it a crime to 
misuse information in the databank itself, the [DNA] samples, which contain an unlimited 
amount of information about the offender, receive little, if any, protection.”); Mark A. 
Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law 
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 158 (2001) (suggesting that sensitive 
genetic information gleaned from DNA samples could be used for illicit purposes). 
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Progress in medical science has rendered possible both the 
collection of DNA on a physically noninvasive basis3 and the 
subsequent creation of identifying DNA profiles, which are 
contained in massive databases.4 Although the use of profiles  
has enhanced the success of criminal investigations,5  
database opponents have voiced concerns about genetic  
privacy6 and the constitutional ramifications of DNA sampling  
and profiling under the First,7 Fourth,8 Fifth,9 Sixth,10 Eighth,11  
 
 3. See Rothstein & Carnahan, supra note 2, at 155 (discussing the noninvasive collection 
of DNA with a buccal swab, which involves brushing the inside of the cheek with cotton); 
Richard Saltus, DNA in Fingerprints Used as Identifier, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 1997, at A5 
(explaining that scientists can generate genetic profiles from objects that an individual has 
merely touched). 
 4. Kaye, supra note 1, at 461–62. 
 5. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (calling DNA technology 
the “single greatest advance in the ‘search for truth’ . . . since the advent of cross-examination”); 
DNA Links Convict to 21-Year-Old Slaying: Evidence Likened to “The Finger of God,” THE 
RECORD (N.J.), Mar. 14, 2000, at A5 (quoting Jeanine Pirro, the district attorney for 
Westchester, NY, comparing DNA evidence to “the finger of God”); Charlie Goodyear & Erin 
Hallissy, Dangerous Delay on DNA: State Struggles to Gather Genetic Profiles of Violent Felons, 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1999, at A1 (describing DNA as the “greatest breakthrough in modern 
crime fighting”). 
 6. See, e.g., Hibbert, supra note 2, at 796–98 (noting that DNA samples, which contain 
sensitive genetic information, receive little statutory protection); Rothstein & Carnahan, supra 
note 2, at 158–59 (hypothesizing that genetic information from DNA samples could be used 
improperly by employers and insurers as well as by child support and immigration agencies); 
Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data 
Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 185, 222–23 (1996) (encouraging the adoption of laws protecting 
sensitive genetic material); see also Allison Ito, Recent Development, Privacy and Genetics: 
Protecting Genetic Test Results in Hawai’i, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 449, 453–57 (2003) (examining 
the need for, and attempts to, protect genetic information obtained outside the law enforcement 
context). 
 7. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998) (addressing a prisoner’s 
claim that drawing blood to secure DNA violated his First Amendment rights). 
 8. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected 
Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 417–45 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s Search and 
Seizure Clause as it applies to DNA sampling and analysis); Kaye, supra note 1, at 472–507 
(analyzing, under the Fourth Amendment, the collection of samples from convicted or arrested 
individuals). 
 9. See, e.g., Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
drawing blood for DNA profiling does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination); Kaye, supra note 1, at 463–64 (asserting that collecting samples from convicted 
or arrested individuals does not violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).  
 10. See, e.g., Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 451–74 (examining the use of DNA 
analysis in prosecutions). 
 11. See, e.g., Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that the 
extraction of a DNA sample was not cruel and unusual punishment). 
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Ninth,12 and Fourteenth13 Amendments. Their admonitions have 
recently assumed new significance, as law enforcement organizations 
have begun obtaining, analyzing, and retaining DNA samples through 
large-scale dragnets.14 DNA dragnets prompt unique concerns 
because they target individuals who lack a criminal history or a 
distinct connection to the crime under investigation.15 Consistent with 
the nature of dragnets, the vast majority of participants have no 
connection to the criminal activity.16  
Thus, law enforcement agencies increasingly find themselves in 
possession of DNA samples from innocent individuals after 
convicting persons responsible for crimes.17 The utility of these 
samples, however, does not subside with the resolution of a criminal 
investigation; rather, the information contained in the samples 
remains attractive to an array of individuals, corporations, and 
agencies outside the law enforcement context. It is well recognized 
that DNA contains information regarding familial lineage, 
predisposition to disease, and even the propensity for aggressive, 
addictive, or criminal behaviors.18 Access to genetic information could 
prove valuable to—and engender discrimination from—insurance 
companies and employers,19 resulting in denied policies or 
 
 12. See, e.g., Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) (confirming the 
dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim that a DNA database statute was unconstitutionally vague and 
conclusory). 
 13. See, e.g., Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 445–47 (discussing the equal protection 
ramifications of DNA profiling); Kaye, supra note 1, at 465–67 (arguing that DNA sampling of 
inmates and arrestees does not offend due process). 
 14. Fred W. Drobner, DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification 
Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479, 479 (2000). 
 15. Id. at 479–80. 
 16. For example, in one dragnet, none of the 160 men tested proved responsible for the 
crime. David Shepardson, Suspects No More, They Want Blood Back, DET. NEWS, July 24, 1995, 
at 1C. 
 17.  See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Grand, Note, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA 
Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2321 (2002) (arguing that samples obtained from dragnets 
should be destroyed or returned to the donor individuals); Shepardson, supra note 16 (noting 
that police planned to retain for thirty years the voluntarily donated DNA samples of 160 men 
declared innocent of the crime under investigation); see also Hibbert, supra note 2, at 809 
(noting that the DNA of convicted individuals who are later exonerated is sometimes not 
expunged from state databanks); Richard Willing, ACLU Seeks to End DNA Dragnet in Search 
for Killer in Mass. Town, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2005, at 6A (explaining that only one innocent 
individual has been successful in suing for the return of his DNA sample). 
 18. Drobner, supra note 14, at 479–80. 
 19. George P. Smith II, Accessing Genomic Information or Safeguarding Genetic Privacy, 9 
J.L. & HEALTH 121, 124 (1994–1995). 
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opportunities for individuals with enhanced susceptibility to mental 
illness, physical disease, or even less-desirable personality traits. 
Conceivably, the release of sensitive genetic information could have 
far-reaching effects, impacting placement decisions by adoption 
agencies, corrupting jury verdicts, and allowing prospective spouses to 
select mates based on perceived genetic advantage.20 At this extreme, 
such biological determinism could induce “geneticide”: on the sole 
basis of individuals’ biological inheritance, society could evict 
“substandard” individuals from a range of traditions and programs 
despite uncertainty that an undesired trait would ever manifest itself. 
Existing jurisprudence and legislation are insufficient to protect 
this sensitive personal information. Proposed solutions to genetic 
discrimination include mechanisms that would limit access to the 
information; however, these suggestions prove inadequate.21 The risk 
 
 20. The history of eugenics in America suggests that genetic information can serve as a 
substantial foundation for discrimination. See Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality: 
What’s the Big Secret?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 589, 595 (1996) (“For most of this 
century, the suggestion of biologically verifiable genetic inferiority was used as the basis for 
sexual sterilization of thousands of residents of state institutions, laws to prohibit interracial 
marriage, and immigration quotas for some ethnic groups.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 21. Potential mechanisms for protecting access to such information include the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101–12,213 (2000) and the Privacy Act of 
1974 (Privacy Act), 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). The ADA states that “[n]o covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12,112a. The Privacy Act requires that any government agency 
retaining records may not “disclose any record . . . by any means of communication to any 
person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written 
consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Nonetheless, both 
“the ADA and the Privacy Act fall short of extending explicit protection to asymptomatic 
individuals with abnormal genotypes.” Smith, supra note 19, at 131. Because the ADA protects 
individuals with manifest disabilities that substantially interfere with a major life activity, it is 
purely speculative as to whether the ADA would prohibit discrimination against an 
asymptomatic individual with a mere genetic predisposition for a trait or illness. Marisa Anne 
Pagnattaro, Genetic Discrimination and the Workplace: Employee’s Right to Privacy v. 
Employer’s Need to Know, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 139, 159–60 (2001); see also June Mary Z. Makdisi, 
Genetic Privacy: New Intrusion a New Tort?, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 975–76 (2001) 
(discussing the weaknesses of the ADA and the Privacy Act in preventing genetic 
discrimination). 
  Additional protections are seemingly available under Executive Order 13,145, which 
prohibits discrimination in federal employment based on genetic information. See Exec. Order 
No. 13,145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2000), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16 (2003). However, not only 
is the order limited in its reach, applying only to federal employees, but it also fails to create any 
legally enforceable right. Pagnattaro, supra, at 157. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000), is an important attempt at 
limiting genetic discrimination in health insurance. Yet, HIPAA does not prevent certain forms 
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of failing protective mechanisms, combined with the reality that 
sample retention is unnecessary to achieve law enforcement interests, 
suggests that preventing sample retention altogether is the more 
prudent solution. This Note, therefore, suggests measures to fill 
existing gaps in jurisprudence and legislation by identifying and 
applying an alternative paradigm that precludes sample retention and 
protects genetic privacy. 
In so doing, this Note investigates the unique constitutional 
issues implicated when law enforcement agencies collect DNA 
samples in dragnets and subsequently retain the samples of innocent 
individuals. Part I reviews the DNA sampling and profiling practices 
currently employed by state and federal law enforcement 
organizations. Part II follows with an analysis of the constitutional 
arguments—premised on the Fourth Amendment and the judicially 
created privacy doctrine—that have traditionally been offered in 
opposition to these identification practices. 
Part III introduces an alternative paradigm, grounded in the 
theoretical and common law definitions of property, for considering 
DNA sampling and sample retention. This paradigm identifies the 
sample as the complete physical specimen that is withdrawn from an 
individual and that contains a wealth of information about genetic 
predispositions. It further distinguishes this physical sample from the 
resulting profile, which is created by scientists and consists merely of 
a numerical code representing the molecular sequence of the physical 
sample. Part III establishes this distinction between a DNA sample 
and a DNA profile as indispensable to the recognition of a DNA 
sample as the property of the individual from whom it was extracted. 
Finally, Part IV invokes this new paradigm as the basis for Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments that better serve to protect the 
rights of innocent individuals whose DNA is collected and retained. 
I.  DNA AND ITS APPLICATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
In the half-century since the discovery of DNA, state and federal 
law enforcement agencies have come to rely on genetic information 
as a central component of their investigative and prosecutorial 
 
of discrimination in premium pricing based on genetic information, nor does it do anything to 
protect people who purchase individual policies instead of group plans. Pagnattaro, supra, at 
167. Finally, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17, may achieve 
some success at prohibiting genetic discrimination; however, it only applies when the disparate 
genetic impact involves “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” id. § 2000e-2(a). 
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duties.22 By gathering DNA samples from criminal perpetrators and 
potential suspects, investigators can utilize elaborate matching 
techniques and systems to determine the probability that any one 
individual is responsible for committing a crime.23 Once a perpetrator 
is positively identified, however, police may remain in possession of 
the DNA samples given by exonerated individuals.24 Sample retention 
is problematic not only because of these individuals’ innocence, but 
also because of the resulting availability of sensitive genetic 
information and the lack of legislative and jurisprudential protections 
guarding release of the information.25 The following Sections provide 
a succinct review of the biological foundations of DNA and discuss 
DNA’s relevance to law enforcement investigation and prosecution.  
A. DNA: A Foundational Review of Human Genetic Material 
In 1953, James D. Watson and Francis H.C. Crick made public 
their research concerning the structure of DNA.26 Their discovery 
would permanently and irrefutably alter the international approach to 
criminal investigation and prosecution.27  
The significance of DNA in effective law enforcement stems 
both from its widespread availability and from its capacity as a unique 
identifier of individuals. With the exception of red blood cells, all of 
the ten trillion cells in the human body28 contain an individual’s 
genetic information in the form of DNA.29 A single DNA strand is 
composed of four types of nucleotide bases: adenine, cytosine, 
thymine, and guanine.30 The oft-conceptualized twisting double helix 
results when a nucleotide base on one DNA strand bonds with a 
 
 22. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 43–65 and accompanying text. 
 24. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 25. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 26. James D. Watson & Francis H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 
NATURE 737, 737 (1953). 
 27. See People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (recognizing the 
significance of DNA fingerprinting in successful prosecutions); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra 
note 8, at 413 (“DNA typing has had a major impact on the criminal justice system.”); Kaye, 
supra note 1, at 457 (noting that the United Kingdom and most continental European countries 
maintain DNA databases for use in criminal prosecutions). 
 28. Randolph M. Nesse & George C. Williams, Evolution and the Origins of Disease, SCI. 
AM., Nov. 1998, at 86, 86. 
 29. Richard A. Nakashima, DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials: A Defense Attorney’s 
Primer, 74 NEB. L. REV. 444, 445 n.1 (1995). 
 30. Id. at 445. 
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corresponding base on a second strand, creating multiple base pairs 
and forming a ladderlike structure that coils back upon itself.31 It is 
this DNA double helix that is contained in each chromosome32 in the 
nucleus of human cells,33 enabling DNA replication within the 
confines of those cells.34  
Greater than 99 percent of DNA is identical among humans and 
is responsible for the basic human form.35 The remaining base pairs, 
however, are unique to each individual and account for the physical 
differences among people.36 It is these individually varying regions, 
known as polymorphic loci, that are used in DNA profiling and 
identification techniques.37 If the loci are identical in two known 
samples, scientists can determine the probability that the samples 
came from the same individual based on the polymorphism’s 
frequency of occurrence in the general population.38  
B. The Relevance of DNA in the Law Enforcement Context 
DNA profiling and identification have become fundamental 
techniques in law enforcement investigation and prosecution. The 
effective matching of samples from potential suspects and criminal 
perpetrators necessitates a four-stage process. First, DNA must be 
collected at the scene of a crime and subsequently analyzed.39 Second, 
law enforcement agencies must select individuals from whom to 
collect DNA and obtain such samples for comparison with the crime 
scene DNA.40 Third, the samples obtained from these individuals 
must be analyzed, and the resulting profiles must be organized in a 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. JAMES L. GOULD & WILLIAM T. KEETON, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 121–22 (6th ed. 
1996).  
 34. T.H. Milby, The New Biology and the Question of Personhood: Implications for 
Abortion, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 31, 34 (1983).  
 35. Sue Rosenthal, Note, My Brother’s Keeper: A Challenge to the Probative Value of DNA 
Fingerprinting, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 195, 198 (1995). 
 36. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 446. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Veronica Valdivieso, Note, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old, Cold Rape Cases?, 90 
GEO. L.J. 1009, 1014 (2002); see id. (noting that a match between samples indicates that the 
suspect is potentially the individual who left the DNA at the crime scene). 
 39. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for 
21st Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 649 (2000). 
 40. D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, 
and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 414. 
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manner conducive to ascertaining a match.41 Finally, government 
agencies and officials must decide whether to retain or destroy the 
original DNA samples.42 This Section elaborates on each of these four 
stages, providing a framework for the subsequent discussion of the 
constitutional issues implicated in the process. 
1. Gathering Samples: Procuring DNA from Perpetrators and 
Potential Suspects. The nature of DNA is such that criminal 
perpetrators will likely leave genetic material at the scenes of their 
crimes.43 During a crime scene investigation, forensic technicians and 
specialists collect such genetic evidence.44 Even the most significant 
amounts of acquired DNA, however, would be of no import without 
comparison samples from potential suspects. 
Law enforcement agencies typically employ one of four 
approaches in identifying a population of potential suspects from 
whom they will collect DNA. Traditionally, state statutes have 
provided for DNA collection from all individuals convicted of violent 
crimes.45 In recent years, many states have statutorily expanded their 
collection parameters; several states now allow for acquisition from 
individuals convicted of nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors, and 
some states permit collection from people merely arrested for 
crimes.46 When an individual has been arrested for or convicted of a 
crime, sample collection is constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment Search and Seizure Clause.47 
Under pressure to combat crime, police departments have begun 
implementing a fourth form of sampling—DNA dragnets.48 Dragnets 
 
 41. Kaye, supra note 1, at 461. 
 42. See Christopher L. Blakesley, La Preuve Pénale et Tests Génétiques United States 
Report, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 610 (Supp. 1998) (“Federal law fails to address the procedure 
for disposition of the DNA samples themselves.”). 
 43. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 436–37 (discussing the range of ways in 
which DNA can be shed by an individual). 
 44. Tracy & Morgan, supra note 39, at 649. 
 45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-11-102.3 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1933 (2000); 
see also David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 179, 180 (2001).  
 46. Kaye, supra note 45, at 180–81.  
 47. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
procurement of genetic information from a convicted felon constituted only a minimal intrusion 
on his Fourth Amendment rights); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 419 (“[I]f a person is 
legitimately under arrest, the seizure of the person is justified . . . .”). 
 48. Drobner, supra note 14, at 479. 
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“are essentially warrantless searches administered en masse to large 
numbers of persons whose only known connection with a given crime 
is that authorities suspect that a particular class of individuals may 
have had the opportunity to commit it.”49 Because dragnets typically 
proceed with the consent of the individuals from whom DNA is 
procured, dragnets do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.50 Should 
an individual refuse to participate in a dragnet, police may comply 
with the Fourth Amendment by obtaining a warrant requiring sample 
donation based on the individual’s refusal to cooperate.51 
The samples, whether acquired voluntarily or mandated on the 
grounds of reasonable suspicion, are procured in noninvasive ways. 
Most commonly, authorities use buccal swabbing, a procedure in 
which the inside of a suspect’s cheek is briefly and painlessly brushed 
with cotton.52 Sample procurement, however, is merely the beginning 
of the analysis. Once the cellular material is obtained, the DNA must 
be extracted from the sample.53 The isolated DNA is then converted 
into a DNA “profile” or “fingerprint” for use by law enforcement in 
the matching process.54 
2. Striking a Match: The Technical and Organizational Systems 
Enabling Profile Comparison. The matching process depends only on 
the existence of a DNA profile and not on the retention of the 
physical sample.55 A DNA sample is the physical specimen withdrawn 
from the cells of an individual, whereas a profile is merely a 
numerical code—created by scientists analyzing the sample—that 
represents the molecular sequence in the physical DNA.56 Only the 
 
 49. Id. at 479–80. 
 50. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 444. 
 51. See With Suspect Caught, Task Force Wrestles with DNA Samples: More Than 1,000 
Swabs Taken from Men, SHREVEPORT TIMES, June 2, 2003, at 3B (explaining that one man who 
refused to volunteer a genetic sample requested during a dragnet was later ordered to submit to 
testing). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 447. DNA sample analysis typically is completed through 
one of two processes: Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) analysis or 
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplification. Id. For an in-depth discussion of these 
methods, see id. at 447–50.  
 54. Drobner, supra note 14, at 483. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Nakashima, supra note 29, 447–50 (discussing the process of extracting DNA from 
a cellular sample and converting that sample into a DNA profile). 
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DNA sample contains information sufficient to discern complex and 
comprehensive information about an individual.57 
DNA samples may reveal private information regarding familial 
lineage and predisposition to over four thousand types of genetic 
conditions and diseases; they may also identify genetic markers for 
traits including aggression, sexual orientation, substance addiction, 
and criminal tendencies.58 In contrast, as a simple series of numbers,59 
a DNA profile serves only identification purposes and can in no way 
indicate information concerning an individual’s personal traits.60 
A DNA profile would be an investigative tool with little intrinsic 
value in the absence of a system to catalog and compare profiles. 
Earning the gratitude of law enforcement agencies, state and federal 
legislatures foresaw and addressed the need for an overarching 
profile organizational system. All fifty states have passed legislative 
provisions authorizing the use of DNA databases to store the genetic 
profiles of convicted criminals.61 To complement these statutes, 
 
 57. Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal 
DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 209 (2000). 
 58. Id. at 209, 212. 
 59. Kaye & Smith, supra note 40, at 431. 
 60. Id. 
 61. ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1105 (Michie 2003); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 295 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-102.3 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
54-102g (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 
2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995 & Supp. 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-603 
(Michie 2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-5501 (Michie 1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West 
1997 & Supp. 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-1 (Michie 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.10 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995 & Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 17.170 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:605 (West Supp. 2004); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1571 (West Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., PUBLIC SAFETY § 2-502 
(2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 22E, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.171 
(West Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-3337 
(2000 & Supp. 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.050 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-102 
(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4104 (Michie 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 176.0913 
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-C:2 (Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
53:1-20.18 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-4 (Michie 2001); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c 
(McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (2000 & Supp. 2003); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 31-13-05 (1996 & Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (West 1997 & Supp. 
2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.27 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.076 (2003); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4702 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-4 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-
3-610 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5A-12 (Michie Supp. 2003); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (2003); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.142 (Vernon 1998 & Supp. 
2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-10-404 (2002 & Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1936 
(2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
HARLAN FINAL.DOC 2/25/2005 2:31 PM 
2004] WHEN PRIVACY FAILS 189 
Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act in 1994.62 The Act 
authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create a 
federal system for sharing profile information contained in state 
databases and provided states up to $40 million to create or improve 
their own databases.63 The FBI responded promptly, implementing 
the National DNA Index System, a national database in which state 
and local law enforcement agencies can include DNA profiles.64 The 
multilevel system of local, state, and national databases, which 
facilitates information sharing and matching across department lines, 
constitutes the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).65 
3. After the Match: Determining the Future of the DNA Sample. 
The final step in the DNA identification and matching process is the 
decision to retain or destroy an original DNA sample.66 Many 
legislatures have enacted statutes regulating sample retention.67 
Twenty-nine states currently authorize or require agencies to retain 
tissue samples after profiling is completed.68 In contrast, only five 
states mandate that officials automatically eliminate innocent 
individuals’ samples from state databanks.69 At least eleven states 
 
43.43.754 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-4 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 165.77 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-402 (Michie 2003). 
 62. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2069 (1994) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 14,132 (2000)). 
 63. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 210. The Act also created quality assurance standards 
for participating laboratories and established penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of 
database information. 42 U.S.C. § 3796kk-2 (2000). 
 64. Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National DNA Index System Reaches 
1,000,000 Profiles, at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/ndis061402.htm (June 14, 2002) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 65. Kaye, supra note 1, at 462. 
 66. See Blakesley, supra note 42, at 610 (noting that procedures for sample disposition are 
governed by state law).  
 67. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211. 
 68. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-20 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102g (West 
2001 & Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 19-5505 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
22E, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 2003 & Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-4 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 
2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.085 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-640 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.43.7532 (West Supp. 2004). For a chart containing databank 
policies by state, see Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 218–20. 
 69. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211; see ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie 2002); CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 299 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-107 (2003); N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 995-c (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1940 (2000). 
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have no policy on sample retention.70 The dearth of statutory 
guidance in these states, and the statutory acceptance or requirement 
of retention in the majority of the remaining jurisdictions, suggest 
that DNA sample retention is far from rare. 
States’ decisions to retain the samples of innocent individuals 
have generated much concern among proponents of individual rights71 
and have produced lawsuits from innocent individuals whose DNA 
was obtained through dragnets. Of the more than twenty-four 
innocent men who have sued for the return of their DNA samples, 
only one has been successful.72 Although the constitutionality of 
retaining samples from any individual may be at issue, the retention 
of a sample belonging to an innocent individual, particularly one who 
was neither arrested nor the focus of individualized suspicion, merits 
unique consideration. This precise situation invites a depth of 
constitutional analysis not implicated by the retention of samples 
procured from convicted, arrested, or suspected individuals.73 In its 
scope, this Note focuses on the issues unique to the retention of 
samples obtained from innocent individuals targeted through 
dragnets. 
II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY ANALYSES  
FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION 
The Fourth Amendment historically provides an implicit right to 
privacy that, at first blush, might appear sufficient to prevent the 
retention of innocent individuals’ DNA samples. Nonetheless, 
although DNA sample collection has traditionally survived judicial 
review, the constitutionality of sample retention implicates a distinct 
analysis and has yet to encounter substantial challenge. Recent 
 
 70. See Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211 (noting that only thirty-nine states have codified 
retention policies for DNA samples from innocent individuals and providing information on the 
policies of thirty-four of those jurisdictions). 
 71. Jane Black, Whose DNA Is It Anyway?: Asking Convicted Felons to Surrender Their 
Genetic Privacy Is One Thing. Making the Same Demand of Innocent People Goes Way Too Far, 
BUS. WK. ONLINE, June 26, 2003, at http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2003/ 
tc20030626_6947_tc073.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal).  
 72. Willing, supra note 17.  
 73. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that convicted 
individuals have lessened privacy expectations with respect to DNA sampling). For a discussion 
of the diminished Fourth Amendment expectations and rights of individuals suspected of or 
arrested for crimes, see Kaye & Smith, supra note 40, at 424, and Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra 
note 8, at 419.  
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judicial decisions, however, suggest that the Fourth Amendment will 
prove inadequate to guard against DNA sample retention. 
A. DNA Sample Collection under the Fourth Amendment 
Individuals concerned with the constitutionality of DNA 
sampling have historically predicated their arguments on the 
judicially created doctrine of privacy.74 Although the Constitution 
does not explicitly grant a right to privacy, intrusions upon an 
individual’s “right to be let alone” implicitly violate the Fourth 
Amendment.75 Recent jurisprudence has strengthened the connection 
between the Fourth Amendment and citizens’ rights to privacy,76 
rendering privacy the Fourth Amendment’s “core value.”77 
The Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment 
provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”78 
When an individual has been convicted of, or arrested for, a crime, 
sample collection is constitutional under the Clause.79 The use of 
large-scale DNA dragnets also survives constitutional review because, 
“[a]s a legal matter, police may ask anyone to give DNA and, as long 
as they do not engage in coercion or misrepresentation, the police 
may collect voluntary samples for analysis.”80 An individual’s refusal 
to submit to dragnet-based testing may arouse heightened suspicion, 
which may be sufficient to judicially compel the individual to provide 
a sample.81 
 
 74. See, e.g., Drobner, supra note 14, at 510 (explaining that the collection of DNA samples 
requires Fourth Amendment analyses because it implicates privacy interests); Rothstein & 
Carnahan, supra note 2, at 153 (noting that the constitutionality of DNA databanks rests on 
Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine). 
 75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 76. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between 
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994). 
 77. Id. 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 79. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1559–60 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the collection of 
DNA from a convicted felon did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights); Imwinkelried & 
Kaye, supra note 8, at 419 (noting that the seizure of an arrested individual is per se justified). 
 80. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 445. 
 81. See Drobner, supra note 14, at 508 (“[P]olice have indicated that anyone refusing to 
yield a DNA sample will likely be under heightened suspicion.”); see also Imwinkelried & Kaye, 
supra note 8, at 423–24 (“If a person can be compelled to submit to fingerprinting on reasonable 
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When individuals subjected to police dragnets submit samples 
voluntarily or by proper court order, the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated. However, only a rote and cursory analysis would lead to 
the conclusion that the subsequent retention of the samples is 
similarly allowed under Fourth Amendment privacy rationales. Such 
an overly deferential approach is unwarranted in light of the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
In determining whether the constitutionality of DNA sample 
retention flows directly from the constitutionality of DNA sample 
procurement, the cornerstone inquiry is the scope of the initial 
consent or court order. The parameters of that consent or order 
dictate whether a second, independent Fourth Amendment analysis 
must be applied to DNA sample retention. 
Although the Court has not addressed the relationship of sample 
procurement to sample retention, it has expressly recognized that the 
initial procurement of a biological sample and the subsequent analysis 
of the sample are two conceptually distinct events necessitating 
independent Fourth Amendment analyses.82 By analogy, the initial 
procurement of a DNA sample for use in solving a specific crime is an 
event conceptually and temporally distinct from the retention of the 
DNA sample for future analysis related to a different crime. Because 
the initial procurement and the retention for later analysis are distinct 
processes, a consent or court order relating to the initial acquisition 
cannot extend to the retention of the sample. Therefore, unless a 
court order or instrument of consent explicitly provides for sample 
retention83—as opposed to the retention of the DNA profile—sample 
retention must survive an independent Fourth Amendment privacy 
analysis. As discussed in the following Section, recent trends in 
 
suspicion rather than probable cause, he or she can be required to submit to DNA sampling on 
the same showing.”). 
 82. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 618 (1989) (noting that 
the “ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion 
of . . . privacy interests,” and holding that “the collection and subsequent analysis of the 
requisite biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches”). 
 83. It is arguable whether individuals could give fully informed consent for long-term or 
permanent DNA sample retention. When individuals consent to the future use of biological 
materials, they are necessarily prevented from providing fully informed consent; consistent with 
advancing scientific technology, the specimens may assume a purpose at the time of sample 
utilization that was not, and could not possibly have been, contemplated at the time of sample 
procurement. Ken M. Gatter, Genetic Information and the Importance of Context: Implications 
for the Social Meaning of Genetic Information and Individual Identity, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 
445–46 (2003). 
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence indicate that even an independent 
privacy analysis fails to prohibit sample retention. 
B. The Fourth Amendment Fails to Guard against the Retention of 
Innocents’ Samples 
It is increasingly evident that Fourth Amendment protections are 
insufficient to guard against the retention of innocent individuals’ 
DNA samples obtained not on the basis of individualized suspicion 
but through DNA dragnets.84 The judicial “skepticism of 
constitutional privacy claims is especially apparent where the 
challenged government intrusion is not the classic police-criminal 
suspect encounter but involves planned government intrusions 
without individualized suspicion.”85 
For two distinct reasons, the Court’s current approach to Fourth 
Amendment analysis is likely insufficient to recognize a constitutional 
violation in the retention of an innocent individual’s DNA sample. 
First, individuals’ privacy interests in genetic material have been 
eradicated by recent scientific advances that enhance the public 
availability of their DNA; accordingly, the government need no 
longer provide a sufficient interest to render constitutional the seizure 
of a DNA sample. Second, the Court’s jurisprudence indicates that 
cellular samples obtained in non–law enforcement contexts 
appropriately may be relegated to subsequent investigative usage. 
1. Recent Jurisprudence Tips the Scales in Favor of the 
Government’s Interests. Under the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the constitutionality of a search and seizure turns on 
whether an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” with 
respect to a particular item and, if so, whether the government’s 
interests outweigh the privacy intrusion.86 A reasonable expectation 
 
 84. See Sundby, supra note 76, at 1754 (arguing generally that the protections granted 
under the Fourth Amendment, particularly “the right to be let alone,” no longer serve 
adequately to limit government intrusion); see also Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: 
Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 49 (1995) (“The Supreme 
Court has dramatically curtailed protection for individual privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment. Contemporary decisions have restricted the warrant requirement, eased the 
government’s burden of justifying searches and seizures, narrowed the definition of both 
searches and seizures, and constrained the ability of individuals to challenge government 
searches.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 85. Sundby, supra note 76, at 1764. 
 86. Id. at 1760. 
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of privacy vests when an individual has no expectation that others will 
have access to the individual’s person or possessions.87 In recent years, 
however, academics have expressed concern that this standard is 
becoming virtually obsolete: 
To maintain privacy, one must not write any checks nor make any 
phone calls. It would be unwise to engage in conversation with any 
other person, or to walk, even on private property, outside one’s 
house. . . . Upon retiring inside, be sure to pull the shades together 
tightly so that no crack exists and to converse only in quiet tones. 
When discarding letters or other delicate materials, do so only after 
a thorough shredding of the documents. . . .88 
Advances in science have rendered DNA ostensibly indiscriminate 
from such “delicate materials” discarded in public places. DNA is 
present on any item touched by an individual; it exists in hair, which is 
shed in public, and in saliva, such that it may be gathered from any 
used cup, straw, or spoon.89 The public nature of DNA belies and 
discredits the expectation that it should remain solely within the 
access of the individual in whose body it originated.90 Thus, the 
traditional inquiry defining a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is 
almost wholly defeated by the unique nature of DNA. 
Under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, “minimizing the 
level of the privacy intrusion can help compensate for a weaker 
government justification.”91 When the reasonable expectation of 
privacy is altogether eradicated, the government’s interest ceases to 
be a significant factor in the constitutionality of a search and seizure.92 
Thus, just as law enforcement’s storage of fingerprints survives 
Fourth Amendment analysis because “fingerprints are an identifying 
 
 87. See id. at 1760–61 (noting that because the Court analyzes issues, such as whether bank 
and phone records should be kept private, by addressing individuals’ expectations of whether 
others will see and use their records, Fourth Amendment protections will decline as 
expectations of privacy fade). 
 88. Id. at 1789–90. 
 89. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 436–37; Saltus, supra note 3. 
 90. See Panel Discussion, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The 
American Legal System’s Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 401, 
409–10 (2002) (remarks of Professor David Kaye) (noting that police have convicted individuals 
using DNA evidence extracted from saliva left on drinking straws). 
 91. Sundby, supra note 76, at 1762. 
 92. See id. at 1760 (explaining that the government’s interest is implicated only if an 
individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” with regard to an item). 
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factor readily available to the world at large,”93 so too will the 
retention of DNA survive constitutional analysis. 
2. Transitioning Uses: The Fourth Amendment Allows Law 
Enforcement to Obtain Cellular Samples from Other Sources. The 
second manner in which the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence fails to protect adequately an innocent individual’s 
DNA sample is evidenced by recent opinions suggesting that law 
enforcement could permissibly analyze and retain cellular samples 
obtained outside the criminal justice context. An analogy to 
fingerprinting again proves instructive: law enforcement may 
assimilate into its files, without violating the constitutional rights of 
fingerprinted individuals, fingerprints obtained in a noncriminal 
context.94 Similarly, law enforcement could integrate DNA samples 
from an individual’s medical records into criminal identification 
files.95  
In 1976, Justice Powell provided the constitutional groundwork 
for such a maneuver: 
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party 
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only 
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.96 
Lower courts have applied Justice Powell’s analysis to the acquisition 
of biological samples.97 “The majority view is that if a private hospital 
 
 93. Palmer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 887, 891 (Ind. 1997). 
 94. Thom v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d sub nom., 
Miller v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1970) (clarifying that Davis v. Mississippi, 394 
U.S. 721 (1969), “does not place any limitations upon the use of fingerprints properly 
obtained”).  
 95. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 433–34 (discussing courts’ willingness to 
allow private medical centers to surrender samples to government authorities); cf. United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (permitting banks to convey voluntarily provided financial 
information to law enforcement authorities). 
 96. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see id. (declining to recognize a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when a bank surrendered copies of the defendant’s bank records, checks, and 
deposit slips because the defendant did not own these records and because they contained 
information that he had provided to the bank voluntarily). 
 97. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 431. But see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 
U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (holding that a public hospital’s surrender of test data to law enforcement was 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment). Ferguson, however, is a narrow decision, dealing only 
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or laboratory obtains a biological sample on its own initiative for 
lawful medical reasons, its subsequent surrender of the sample to the 
authorities does not violate any constitutionally protected expectation 
of privacy.”98 This view assumes monumental significance upon the 
recognition that most individuals consent to provide biological 
samples to hospitals at some point in their lifetimes.99 
A second source of DNA that may not invite Fourth 
Amendment protection under the Court’s current analysis is cellular 
material inadvertently abandoned in public places. 
[C]ollecting DNA left in public places entails neither a bodily 
invasion nor a seizure of the person. It seems clear that, in a public 
restaurant after a suspect departed, the police could pick up a coffee 
cup used by the suspect and, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, examine it for fingerprints.100 
Moreover, abandoned DNA samples are necessarily at greater risk 
for retention; in states without statutorily mandated sample 
destruction, individual litigation is the only mechanism to prevent 
sample retention. Yet, individuals who fail to recognize that their 
DNA has been collected and analyzed will lack sufficient awareness 
to litigate.  
The Court’s probable recognition of a lessened privacy interest 
in DNA and potential approval of alternative sources for DNA 
collection and storage demonstrate well the jurisprudential 
limitations on Fourth Amendment protections. Although traditional 
Fourth Amendment notions of privacy are manifestly inadequate to 
require either the destruction or return of DNA samples, an 
alternative paradigm would assure concerned courts, legislatures, and 
sample providers that individuals would receive protection. 
Specifically, the theoretical and common law framework of property 
 
with programs “developed by the police and a public hospital requiring the systematic 
disclosure of patient records for the ‘primary purpose’ of advancing ‘the general interest in 
crime control.’” Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 435–36 (quoting Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 
81). If a hospital obtained data as a function of regular hospital procedures, presumably Miller 
would control. Id. at 436; see also Kaye & Smith, supra note 40, at 437 (noting that Miller is not 
easily distinguished from cases involving medical records, including DNA samples contained in 
tissue repositories). 
 98. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 433–34. 
 99. See People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 324 (Mich. 1990) (Levin, J., dissenting) (“In 
today’s society, a person has little choice but to undergo medical treatment at a medical facility, 
generally licensed by and authorized to operate by the state.”). 
 100. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 439. 
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doctrine provides an appropriate sanctuary for individual rights by 
constructing an analytical foundation sufficient to prevent the 
retention of an innocent individual’s DNA sample. 
III.  PROTECTING INNOCENTS UNDER PROPERTY  
DOCTRINE: TOWARD A RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY  
RIGHTS IN EXTRACTED DNA 
Neither America’s forefathers nor its current elected 
representatives have enacted provisions that expressly recognize a 
property right in one’s physical person. In light of recent 
biotechnological advances, however, this approach proves 
increasingly anachronistic. Rather, a judicially or legislatively created 
proprietary interest in genetic materials—even one limited to samples 
obtained from innocent individuals in a law enforcement context—is 
the only paradigm that provides a sufficient conceptual infrastructure 
for the consideration and protection of genetic material. Moreover, 
recognizing property rights in DNA samples is consistent with the 
historical and theoretical underpinnings of property. Finally, the 
jurisprudential challenges and policy-based concerns animating 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California,101 commonly cited by 
opponents of a recognized property interest in genetic material, are 
not implicated in the distinct situation that arises when DNA is 
procured from an innocent individual for law enforcement purposes.  
A. Recent Technological Advances Challenge Traditional 
Nonproprietary Notions of the  Body 
The Constitution fails to recognize an express property interest 
in the body or body parts.102 Similarly, no federal statute governs the 
individual ownership of genetic material.103 Until recently, the absence 
of recognized property rights was appropriately premised on the 
notion that the distinct attributes of property were poorly suited to 
the human body.104 Underlying this justification was the normative 
 
 101. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 102. See Carol A. Schneider et al., Patenting Life: A View from the Constitution and Beyond, 
24 WHITTIER L. REV. 406, 406 (2002) (noting that the Constitution does not recognize a 
property interest in genetic material, particularly after that material leaves the human body). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Examination of Property Law and 
Biotechnology, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1167, 1170–71 (1995) (asserting that the attributes of 
property law are not properly applied to biotechnological discoveries in the human body). 
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understanding that property rights vest in those items that have 
economic value.105 
Technological advances, however, are eroding the delicate 
support for this argument. Currently, the law permits the sale or trade 
of specific classes of body parts on the open market.106 
Biotechnological and genetic research further commodifies body 
parts, generating billions of dollars of economic gain from the use of 
information and materials gleaned from biological laboratory 
studies.107 Even the application of DNA identification techniques to 
law enforcement confers an economic benefit. By increasing the 
efficiency and efficacy of criminal investigations and prosecutions,108 
the government reduces the associated costs of crime control. 
Although the economic value formulation of property rights 
supports conceptualizing a proprietary interest in DNA, a second 
ideational framework demonstrates the necessity of a recognized 
property right. The human form has historically evoked debate over 
its proper categorization as property or, alternatively, as the subject 
of privacy rights.109 In contemporary discussions, however, only the 
property perspective provides the appropriate context for an 
informed consideration of genetic material extracted from an 
individual. 
It is precisely the recent enhancements in the usefulness of DNA 
and in the ability to extract DNA from the human body that render 
property doctrine the superior framework for analyzing genetic 
material removed from an individual. So long as a strand of DNA 
remains within the physical confines of a living body, the DNA and 
the individual are “indivisible and inextricably intertwined.”110 This 
 
 105. Id. at 1172–73. 
 106. See Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most 
Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 
45, 79 (1995) (noting that existing laws “permit the sale of human blood, semen, and other 
regenerative body tissue and by-products”). 
 107. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 504 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(“John Moore’s mere cells could become the foundation of a multi-billion dollar industry from 
which patent holders could reap fortunes.”).  
 108. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 109. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 
363 (2000) (discussing this debate and suggesting that “[t]he law of the body is currently in a 
state of confusion and chaos”). 
 110. See id. at 364 (noting that privacy theory envisions the body and the person as 
necessarily fused). 
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gestalt formulation favors a privacy analysis.111 In contrast, DNA 
extracted from an individual assumes an identity of its own. “[W]hen 
the human body is fragmented from the person and it becomes 
possible to disaggregate rights in the body . . . we should employ the 
property paradigm because it alone possesses the conceptual 
framework and the vocabulary for allocating rights and 
responsibilities among all those who share an interest . . . .”112 
Not only does a reconsideration of DNA as property prove 
necessary in light of technological advances, but it also comports with 
the theoretical infrastructure supporting property rights. Three 
theories—libertarian or labor, utilitarian, and personality—have 
dominated the analysis, application, and justification of private 
property rights.113 
B. The Theoretical Infrastructure Supports a Property Paradigm for 
Extracted DNA 
Applying the labor, utilitarian, and personality theories to an 
analysis of property rights in a DNA sample demonstrates that the 
concept of DNA as property is consistent with the theoretical 
foundations of property. However, more importantly, this analysis is 
also instructive in determining in whom the property right in DNA 
vests. An analysis premised on the three theories confirms that a 
DNA sample—as distinguished from a DNA profile created from the 
sample—is the property of the individual from whose body it was 
extracted. Conversely, under the labor and utilitarian theories, the 
DNA profile constitutes the property of the law enforcement agency 
that created and cataloged it. 
Labor or libertarian theory asserts that property rights inhere in 
things that individuals create with their own labor.114 Under a labor 
theory analysis, the critical characteristic of DNA is its ability to 
replicate within the cells of the body. As the individual’s body is the 
sole entity responsible for DNA production, the labor theory 
 
 111. See id. (“[W]hen we seek to preserve the physical integrity of the body without 
necessarily permitting rights in the human body to be conveyed to others, and when we wish to 
shield intimate associations but not arms-length transactions, we should adopt the language of 
privacy rather than that of property.”).  
 112. Id. 
 113. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property 
in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 568 (1995). 
 114. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
para. 27, at 305–06 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690).  
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postulates that DNA belongs to the body that created it. In contrast, a 
DNA profile is distinctly a product of the technicians who extracted 
the DNA from the physical sample and subjected it to the chemical 
analysis that resulted in the profile.115 The profile should, therefore, be 
recognized as the property of those technicians or their employers. 
The utilitarian theory justifies private property ownership on the 
premise that society benefits from private, rather than communal, 
ownership of property.116 This theory implies a two-step analysis that 
first inquires whether there is societal benefit in use of an item and 
second questions whether the greatest benefit arises from private or 
from communal ownership of the item. 
Applying this analysis to the use of DNA in a criminal justice 
setting requires preliminary recognition that both DNA samples, 
which are necessary for creating profiles, and profiles themselves 
bestow a benefit on society by enhancing the accuracy and efficiency 
of law enforcement. Nonetheless, communal ownership of and access 
to DNA samples and profiles harm society in a manner that private 
ownership of samples and profiles would avoid. Specifically, 
communal access to samples renders their genetic information 
publicly available and, therefore, increases the risk of widespread 
societal discrimination. Further, communal access to DNA profiles 
could detrimentally increase traffic on the nation’s law enforcement 
databases, impeding database use by the agencies that confer its 
societal benefit. The detriment arising from communal access to 
DNA samples and profiles reduces the net social benefit of their use 
and, accordingly, suggests that private property interest in both 
samples and profiles would secure the greatest social benefit. 
The paradigm of societal benefit also supports a proprietary 
distinction between the sample and the profile. Once a profile has 
been created from a sample, only that profile remains necessary for 
the DNA matching techniques that benefit society. Moreover, public 
gain is maximized by vesting private ownership of the profile in the 
party who can most effectively use it for the public interest; public 
service agencies, such as law enforcement, comprise the ideal 
candidates for this role. By contrast, no additional law enforcement 
benefits derive from the retention of the physical sample.117 Because 
 
 115. See Nakashima, supra note 29, at 447–50 (discussing the process of DNA analysis). 
 116. Gerstenblith, supra note 113, at 568. 
 117. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (explaining that the profile, and not the 
sample, is used in law enforcement investigation and prosecution). 
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retention risks engendering discrimination against individuals who 
provide samples—by exposing their genetic predispositions to 
physical disease, mental illness, or criminality118—utilitarian theory 
counsels the vesting of sample ownership in the individual donors.   
Finally, the personality theory posits that personal property is 
property that is “particularly important to the self-realization and 
fulfillment of an individual’s personality.”119 Personality theory 
demands the recognition of DNA property rights and further 
necessitates the distinction between the rights vested in the sample 
and those pertaining to the profile. The sample, at the most basic 
level of abstraction, is the “self-realization and fulfillment of an 
individual’s personality.”120 Two distinct rationales require this 
conclusion. First, the genetic material itself is the sole coding 
mechanism for the human traits expressed in every individual.121 
Second, the sample, even once extracted, has the potential to impact 
dramatically an individual’s self-realization. The physical sample 
contains a wealth of personal, sensitive information,122 which, if 
released, could induce discrimination threatening individuals’ ability 
to fulfill the dictates of their personality, such as the desire to pursue 
employment in a particular field.123 Identical arguments do not, 
however, apply to the DNA profile; as a numerical code, it contains 
neither the genetic material essential for human development nor the 
genetic information necessary to engender discrimination. Thus, 
personality theory’s focus on individual self-realization requires 
recognizing property rights in samples but does not support a 
proprietary interest in profiles. 
In its effect, personality theory departs significantly from labor 
and utilitarian approaches. Whereas personality theory recognizes a 
property right only in the physical sample, labor and utilitarian 
theories not only support property interests in both the sample and 
the profile, but also confirm that the property interest in the sample 
vests in the individual from whom it was extracted while the 
proprietary right to the profile inheres in the scientists who created it. 
 
 118. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 119. Gerstenblith, supra note 113, at 568. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 198. 
 122. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 211. 
 123. See Pagnattaro, supra note 21, at 154–55 (noting the potential employment 
discrimination that might result from the release of sensitive genetic information). 
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C. Surviving Judicial and Policy-Based Challenges to the Property 
Paradigm: Distinguishing Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California 
Despite the congruity of traditional property theory and the 
acknowledgment of DNA as property, many scholars continue to 
assert that common law jurisprudence undermines the recognition of 
property rights in DNA. A significant number of academics 
addressing ownership of genetic material predicate their arguments124 
on the seminal case of Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California.125 
In Moore, the California Supreme Court rejected, inter alia, the 
conversion claim of John Moore, a patient whose cells were used to 
create a patented cell line.126 The court reasoned that any successful 
conversion claim must arise from Moore’s retention of an ownership 
interest in his cells following their removal from his body.127 The 
court’s identification of “several reasons to doubt that he did retain 
any such interest”128 has provided opponents of a recognized property 
interest in DNA with substantial fodder for their arguments. 
Closer analysis, however, reveals that Moore is not directly 
applicable when a DNA sample is procured from an innocent 
individual for law enforcement purposes. Not only does Moore fail to 
defeat the conceptualization of a DNA sample as property, but the 
court’s analysis of the “reasons to doubt” Moore’s ongoing property 
interest instead reinforces the argument that a DNA sample, in the 
limited situation addressed in this Note, deserves property right 
recognition. 
1. Recognizing the Applicability of Favorable Judicial Precedent. 
In denying Moore’s conversion claim, the court first focused on the 
absence of judicial decisions holding that an individual’s interest in 
excised cells was sufficient to support a conversion cause of action.129 
 
 124. E.g., Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1037, 1064–68 (1993); Laura J. Hilmert, Cloning Human Organs: Potential Sources 
and Property Implications, 77 IND. L.J. 363, 375–77 (2002); Rao, supra note 109, at 373–75; 
Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 664 (1998). 
 125. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 126. Id. at 481–82, 493. 
 127. Id. at 489. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 489 n.28. 
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The sole case supporting this proposition—cited in the California 
Court of Appeal decision and discussed in the California Supreme 
Court’s decision130—was Venner v. State,131 decided by the Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals. The Venner court, considering a challenge 
to the suppression of evidence in a criminal procedure matter, 
weighed the possibility that the defendants could retain property 
rights in biological products removed from the body.132 In its analysis, 
the court reasoned that it was “not unknown for a person to assert a 
continuing right of ownership, dominion, or control, for good reason 
or for no reason, over such things as excrement, fluid waste, 
secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails, blood, and organs or other parts 
of the body.”133 This rationale provided the California Court of 
Appeal in Moore with support for its conclusion that property rights 
inhere in excised cellular material.134  
The California Supreme Court, however, declined to adopt the 
Venner reasoning in Moore, distinguishing the cases on the ground 
that Venner “involved a criminal-procedure dispute . . . and not a civil 
dispute over who was entitled to the economic benefit of property.”135 
Notably, a DNA sample obtained and retained by law enforcement as 
a function of an investigative dragnet involves, by its nature, “a 
criminal-procedure dispute” and not merely a debate over the 
economic value of a sample. The Moore decision, therefore, in no way 
casts doubt on the Venner reasoning in a criminal law enforcement 
context; rather, the Venner rationale likely remains sufficient to 
justify a “continuing right of ownership” over the DNA samples at 
issue in this Note. 
2. Overcoming Statutory Hurdles to Proprietary Rights. After 
addressing the absence of jurisprudence supporting a conversion 
claim, the Moore court next acknowledged that specialized statutes 
regulating the disposition of a body and its parts provide greater 
guidance in efforts to decipher ownership of biological materials than 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976). 
 132. See id. at 498–99 (holding that law enforcement officers could constitutionally seize a 
defendant’s abandoned feces for narcotics testing). 
 133. Id. at 498 (footnote omitted). 
 134. 793 P.2d at 489 n.28.  
 135. Id. The court further noted that the disparate nature of criminal-procedure disputes 
and civil disputes required the conclusion that the Venner opinion was “grounded in markedly 
different policies” and so had “little relevance” to the Moore case. Id.  
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does the law of conversion.136 However, the conclusion that statutory 
regulation of disposition either evidences the absence of a proprietary 
right or eradicates a property interest is both shortsighted and far-
reaching.  
Indeed, the very existence of regulatory statutes implies the 
presence of a proprietary right in biological materials: if individuals 
possessed no proprietary interest in their biological materials, such 
statutes would prove superfluous. Furthermore, it cannot reasonably 
be asserted that laws regulating the use and disposition of material 
items eradicate a property interest in those items. Much to the 
contrary, regulation acknowledges a proprietary right and merely 
limits property use and disposition in an effort to advance a greater 
societal benefit. Surely, it is not defensible to assert that an individual 
who possesses title to an automobile, but is constrained by laws 
prohibiting speeding, has therefore lost property rights in the 
automobile. With respect to laws governing disposition, it is no more 
defensible to assert that merchants who purchase alcohol for resale 
possess no property interest in the purchased product merely because 
they cannot sell it to minors. By analogy, laws regulating the use or 
prohibiting the disposition of bodily materials should not be 
dispositive in a decision to deny property rights in such materials. 
Two acts commonly cited in opposition to the recognition of 
property rights in biological materials are the National Organ 
Transplant Act (NOTA)137 and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(UAGA).138 Both acts prohibit individuals from selling organs, 
prompting opponents of biological property rights to argue that these 
limits on alienation eradicate such property rights. Undermining this 
claim, however, is the legislative history of at least one of these acts. 
 
 136. Id. at 489. 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); see, e.g., Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ 
Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681, 715 (1988) (explaining that 
NOTA’s restrictions on organ sales preempt a property interest in post-mortem human organs).  
 138. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 17 (2003); see, e.g., Melissa 
A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs: Changes to Ohio Anatomical 
Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 37, 54 (2002) (recognizing Ohio’s 
adoption of the 1987 UAGA’s prohibition on the sale of body parts as “[t]he single most 
important provision curtailing the possibility . . . [of] property rights in . . . body parts”). The 
original UAGA, promulgated in 1968, was adopted by all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia by 1973. In 2000, twenty-three states had adopted the 1987 amended version. Leonard 
H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal Considerations in 
Rejecting a Deceased’s Anatomical Gift Because There is No Consent by the Survivors, 78 N.D. 
L. REV. 323, 331 (2002).  
HARLAN FINAL.DOC 2/25/2005 2:31 PM 
2004] WHEN PRIVACY FAILS 205 
The animating principle of NOTA was not to expressly define 
property rights in biological materials, but merely to clarify that 
“human body parts should not be viewed as commodities.”139  
Even if UAGA’s and NOTA’s alienation restrictions were 
sufficient to eradicate a property right in some biological materials, 
the acts fail to abolish such a right in all biological materials. Instead, 
the acts grant full rights of alienation for certain cellular products, 
including sperm cells and plasma-based blood cells.140 Two rationales 
justify the distinction between the alienability of these specific 
cellular products and that of other tissue and organ systems. 
First, courts have distinguished between the alienability of 
regenerative and nonregenerative body parts.141 A decision to donate 
or sell a regenerative body part does not implicate concerns about a 
transferor’s physical health, as would the alienation of a 
nonrenewable organ.142 Thus, courts and legislatures traditionally 
have recognized renewable tissues, including hair, blood, and sperm, 
as property.143 DNA is akin to these renewable body parts because it 
is also capable of replicating without end.144 A donation or sale of 
DNA, therefore, does not invite concern about the compromised 
physical health of an individual from whom DNA was extracted. In 
fact, DNA is unintentionally shed by every individual in society on a 
virtually nonstop basis.145 Furthermore, DNA’s existence in every 
nucleated cell in the body assures an ever-present supply of DNA for 
replication throughout the life of an individual.146 By analogy to hair, 
 
 139. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 16 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982.  
 140. Phillipe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 254 
(1996). The legislative history of NOTA evidences that Congress did not intend the Act to apply 
to replenishable tissues, such as sperm and blood. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16, reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992. 
 141. Hilmert, supra note 124, at 378; see Banks, supra note 106, at 79 (discussing a proposal 
that “would expand existing laws, which permit the sale of human blood, semen, and other 
regenerative body tissue and by-products, to include nonregenerative . . . organs”). 
 142. Banks, supra note 106, at 79. 
 143.  Id. at 47; Hilmert, supra note 124, at 378; see Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
275 (Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing a property interest in sperm removed from the body); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (exempting renewable tissues from the provisions of NOTA).  
 144. Milby, supra note 34, at 34. 
 145. DNA is deposited when an individual drinks, sneezes, or sheds hair, dandruff, or skin 
cells. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 437–38 (“The deposition of DNA in public 
places cannot be avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in using extraordinary 
containment measures.”); Lombardo, supra note 20, at 601 (“A resourceful technician could 
probably lift DNA from a licked stamp or abrasive doorknob . . . .”).  
 146. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 445. 
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blood, and sperm, the renewable nature of DNA should similarly 
shelter it from alienability restrictions and support its designation as 
property. 
The second distinction between biological materials that have 
been statutorily recognized as property and those that have not is 
premised on the unique functions of certain cells. Courts have 
provided special property recognition to gametic materials 
commensurate with their significant role in the creation of human 
life.147 DNA serves a similarly necessary and irreplaceable role in the 
creation of life. With the advent of cloning technologies, particularly 
somatic cell nuclear transfer procedures, individual pieces of DNA 
can be used to create new organisms.148 There is little doubt that these 
scientific advances will eventually—if only from the perspective of 
technological certainty—result in the ability to clone humans.149 Thus, 
consistent with the special property recognition provided to gametic 
materials, courts should acknowledge such property rights in DNA 
samples. 
DNA’s regenerative ability and its essential role in creating life 
remove it from the ambit of statutes prohibiting the alienation of 
biological materials; thus, even if statutory alienability restrictions 
were per se sufficient to eradicate property rights, the classification of 
DNA as property would survive such statute-based arguments. 
Moreover, the general analysis suggesting that property rights are 
precluded by the very existence of biological regulatory statutes 
misconceives the nature of regulation and should not undermine a 
property interest in DNA. 
3. Recognizing the Inherent Personality Attributes of DNA. The 
third approach of the California Supreme Court in refusing to 
acknowledge Moore’s property right was to find inapplicable the 
lower court’s argument that property rights in genetic material stem 
 
 147. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 
1992)) (holding that an individual’s cryogenically preserved sperm were his property); see also 
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 426–27 (E.D. Va. 1989) (recognizing a property interest in a 
cryopreserved pre-zygote). 
 148. See Stephanie J. Hong, Note, And “Cloning” Makes Three: A Constitutional 
Comparison Between Cloning and Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 26 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 741, 746–47 (1999) (describing somatic cell nuclear transfer procedures, in which 
genetic material is extracted from the cells of an adult and inserted into an unfertilized egg that 
is then implanted in an adult female for gestation). 
 149. Katheryn D. Katz, The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction, 8 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (1997). 
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from a “proprietary interest in one’s persona.”150 In rejecting the 
lower court’s argument, the California Supreme Court reasoned that 
the genetic material at issue was not unique to Moore but rather was 
identical in every person, thereby eradicating any connection between 
biological material and a proprietary interest in a persona.151 
The persona definition of property gathers its animating 
principles from personality theory, which postulates that personal 
property comprises those items “particularly important to the self-
realization and fulfillment of an individual’s personality.”152 However, 
“[o]nly by establishing a connection between the individual and a 
unique piece of genetic information (and not all genetic information 
is unique) will there be an impact on identity.”153 In contrast to the 
cell lines at issue in Moore, the DNA samples retained by law 
enforcement do not escape the reach of a personality theory of 
property. Rather, because DNA, by definition, is unique in all 
individuals except identical twins,154 there is necessarily “a connection 
between the individual and a unique piece of genetic information” 
that satisfies the Moore court’s standard for a proprietary interest in 
one’s persona. 
4.  Comporting with Libertarian Justifications for DNA Property 
Rights. Finally, the Moore court refused to recognize a property 
interest in Moore’s biological materials because the patented cell line 
was “factually and legally distinct” from the cells collected from 
Moore.155 The patented cells were “more the product of the work 
done by the researchers than the raw materials (cells) taken from 
Moore.”156 
This analysis, which is consistent with a labor theory of property, 
lacks substance when applied to the retention of DNA samples by law 
enforcement agencies. Just as the disputed cells in Moore necessitated 
a “distinction between primary cells (cells taken directly from the 
body) and patented cell lines,”157 the cellular DNA samples discussed 
 
 150. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 490 (Cal. 1990). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Gerstenblith, supra note 113, at 568; see also supra notes 119–20 and accompanying 
text. 
 153. Gatter, supra note 83, at 458. 
 154. Nakashima, supra note 29, at 446. 
 155. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492. 
 156. Hilmert, supra note 124, at 376. 
 157. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492 n.35. 
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in this Note require a distinction between primary cells and created 
DNA profiles. DNA samples are composed only of cells taken 
directly from the body and, unlike the cell lines in Moore, are not 
“the product of ‘human ingenuity.’”158 DNA profiles, however, are 
solely a product of human invention and labor. This distinction not 
only reinforces the notion of a DNA sample as the property of the 
individual from whom it is procured, but it also supports the concept 
that a DNA profile is the product of the law enforcement agency that 
created it.159 
5. Employing Legislative Solutions to Policy-Based Problems. In 
addition to the four legal arguments discussed above, the Moore court 
provided a significant policy justification for its refusal to recognize 
an ownership interest in Moore’s cells.160 “Research on human cells 
plays a critical role in medical research. . . . The extension of 
conversion law into this area will hinder research by restricting access 
to the necessary raw materials.”161 The concern of the Moore court is 
significant; however, it should not eclipse the recognition of property 
rights in DNA samples retained for law enforcement purposes. There 
are, instead, less restrictive alternatives that balance the court’s 
interest in facilitating research with the recognition of a property right 
in DNA. 
One such alternative approach was embodied in a piece of model 
legislation known as the Genetic Privacy Act (GPA).162 In 1995, a 
committee funded by the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications 
program of the Human Genome Project, the Office of Energy 
Research, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Boston University 
School of Public Health released a proposal for federal legislation 
that would have dramatically changed the legal landscape concerning 
property rights in DNA.163 The proposed GPA explicitly mandated 
that DNA remain the property of the individual from whom it was 
 
 158. Id. at 492 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
 159. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 160. Moore, 793 P.2d at 493. 
 161. Id. at 494. 
 162. GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY (1995), 
available at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/resource/privacy/privacy1.html. 
 163. Id. 
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obtained—so long as the DNA sample was linked to information that 
identified the individual.164 
Although the GPA was introduced in Congress in 1995,165 it was 
never enacted.166 Nonetheless, it provides an important example of a 
means by which a DNA property interest could be recognized 
without imposing a chill on research. Because any DNA used in 
criminal investigation or prosecution must necessarily be linked to a 
specific, named individual, a DNA sample retained by law 
enforcement must remain the property of the individual from whom it 
was obtained.167 This conclusion does not, however, retain its veracity 
in the laboratory setting. Rather, in a research setting, samples could 
be collected, retained, and tested anonymously.168 Researchers could 
even group together samples from a given individual by assigning that 
individual a fictitious identifier that would not reveal the individual’s 
actual identity. Under the GPA, the anonymous nature of a DNA 
sample used in research would prevent its classification as the private 
property of its source. Legislation such as the GPA, therefore, would 
mitigate the Moore court’s concern by recognizing property rights in 
DNA samples obtained for law enforcement without imposing 
restraints on scientific research. 
The preceding analysis of the theoretical, jurisprudential, and 
policy-based foundations of property supports the recognition of 
property rights in DNA samples collected for law enforcement 
purposes. Even if this recognition must be limited specifically to the 
class of DNA samples at issue in this Note, such recognition remains 
a substantial victory for those individuals whose DNA samples have 
been procured for law enforcement purposes. Under the diminishing 
 
 164. Id. § 104(a); Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for 
National Legislation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 4–5 (1996). 
 165. In 1995, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon introduced the Genetic Privacy and 
Nondiscrimination Act of 1995 in the Senate. S. 1416, 104th Cong. (1995). The Senate 
subsequently referred it to the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. Id. Then, on 
November 29, 1995, Representative Clifford B. Sterns of Florida introduced the same bill in the 
House of Representatives, which referred the bill to the House Committee on Commerce, 
Economic and Educational Opportunities, and Government Reform and Oversight. H.R. 2690, 
104th Cong. (1995). 
 166. Ito, supra note 6, at 467. 
 167. See Roche et al., supra note 164, at 4–5 (noting that the GPA, which would apply only 
to genetic samples linked to identifiable individuals, would mandate that DNA remain the 
property of the individual from whom it was obtained). 
 168. In the majority of genetic research, DNA samples are not traceable to a specific 
individual. Schneider et al., supra note 102, at 413. 
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protection of privacy discussed in Part II, this property interest—and 
the legal rights that arise from its recognition—provide a critical 
safeguard enabling constitutional protection. 
Part IV proceeds with just one example of the manner in which a 
recognized property interest could, in practice, provide individuals 
with the protection that they deserve. Additional consideration of the 
following example—and the range of statutory, common law, and 
constitutional causes of action arising from the recognized property 
interest—is warranted. 
IV.  BY INVOKING A PROPERTY PARADIGM, COURTS CAN UTILIZE 
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO PROTECT AGAINST THE RETENTION OF 
INNOCENTS’ DNA SAMPLES 
At a fundamental level, the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution protects citizens’ rights to their life, liberty, or 
property.169 The Fourteenth Amendment further precludes states 
from abridging these rights170 and also incorporates the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, rendering it applicable to the 
states.171 The scope of this constitutional protection, however, 
necessarily includes only those items appropriately characterized as 
life, liberty, or property. Thus, the conclusion reached in Part III of 
this Note—that the DNA samples at issue herein are the subject of 
property rights—provides an indispensable foundation for Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments that prohibit the government 
from retaining the DNA samples of innocent individuals.172 The 
Amendments provide these protections through two distinct 
mechanisms. 
First, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit governments from depriving a citizen of 
property without providing due process of law.173 Second, under the 
 
 169. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
 171. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).  
 172. Arguably, a sample provided consensually cannot constitute an unconstitutional 
deprivation; however, the consensual provision of a sample does not necessarily extend to 
consent to retain the sample. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. Part IV of this Note 
assumes that the consent or court order sufficient to procure the initial sample does not extend 
to the subsequent retention of the sample. 
 173. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, “private property [may not] be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”174 
A. The Due Process Clause Affords Greater Security to Innocents 
Desiring Sample Expungement 
The protective duties of the Due Process Clause are binary. 
Procedural due process is “a guarantee of fair procedure”175 whereby 
a state may not “take property without providing appropriate 
procedural safeguards”176 to the individual possessing the relevant 
property interest. In contrast, substantive due process “bars certain 
arbitrary government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.’”177 
The initial inquiry in a procedural due process analysis seeks to 
identify a particular government action that causes a deprivation of 
property.178 In application, this inquiry requires consideration of three 
separate issues: whether a party responsible for a deprivation is acting 
on behalf of a governmental body; whether an item allegedly being 
deprived is, in fact, property; and whether a deprivation of that item 
has occurred. 
Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies are, without 
exception, public bodies created and regulated by governments; thus, 
the retention of a DNA sample by law enforcement is a government 
action. That the samples being retained are the property of the 
individuals from whom they were extracted is demonstrated in Part 
III. Finally, courts have consistently found deprivations of property 
when “a government official participated in the physical deprivation 
of what had concededly been the constitutional plaintiff’s property 
under state law before the deprivation occurred.”179 If a DNA sample 
 
 174. Id. amend. V. 
 175. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 176. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 177. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion, 474 U.S. at 331). 
 178. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195 (2001). 
 179. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (invalidating a statute allowing wage 
garnishment without notice or an opportunity for a hearing); Alan R. Madry, State Action and 
the Due Process of Self-Help, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000); see also N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. 
Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a statute that failed to provide for 
due process in permitting garnishment of a bank account); BERNARD SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND 
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATIONS 27 (1997) 
(noting that a regulation that interferes with the “prerogatives of ownership . . . comes under the 
prohibition of the due process clause”). 
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is property, a law enforcement agency is a government actor, and the 
agency physically and permanently removed a sample from an 
individual, a deprivation has occurred. 
The deprivation itself, however, is not the “wrong” targeted by 
the procedural due process claim. Indeed, “[i]n a procedural due 
process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is 
unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without 
due process of law—without adequate procedures.”180 The Court has 
generally recognized that adequate procedures provide individuals 
with sufficient notice of a forthcoming deprivation and an 
opportunity to present their concerns in an effort to prevent the 
deprivation.181 Although twenty-nine states182 statutorily approve or 
mandate sample retention, it is unlikely that the mere existence of 
such public laws constitutes sufficient notice of deprivation.183 
Nonetheless, even if such notice were sufficient, there is—in the 
rather comprehensive literature discussing DNA dragnets—no 
intimation that individuals targeted by dragnets received an 
opportunity to oppose the retention of their samples. 
The Court has, however, declined to create a per se rule that a 
full evidentiary hearing is required before any deprivation.184 Rather, 
the Court determines the exact extent of procedure owed to 
individuals with a three-part balancing test first enunciated in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
 
 180. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 181. Allen v. Leis, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1266 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has 
been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that 
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”)(quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 
233 (1864)). 
 182. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 183. See Menefee & Son v. Dep’t of Food & Agric., 245 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170–71 (Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that an agriculture statute mandating crop seizure under certain specified 
conditions failed to provide sufficient notice of deprivation when such conditions were met and 
thus did not comport with the requirements of due process).  
 184. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976). 
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.185 
Applying the tripartite analysis announced in Mathews, it 
becomes evident that the state’s retention of DNA samples is 
constitutionally deserving of greater procedural safeguards. First, the 
private interest affected by the retention of an innocent individual’s 
DNA sample is significant. Most notably, a sample contains a vast 
array of personal and sensitive information186 that could engender 
discriminatory treatment of an individual.187 Constitutional 
jurisprudence has traditionally placed great significance on 
preventing discrimination based on an individual’s immutable traits.188 
Just as an individual’s race and gender are immutable,189 so too is the 
individual’s genetic composition. Indeed, not only is genetic 
composition, in itself, unalterable, but it also directly determines such 
traits as race and gender. It follows that courts would recognize the 
protection of sensitive genetic information as a significant private 
interest. 
Secondly, there is a substantial risk that the privacy interest will 
be erroneously deprived. In states that have failed to enact laws either 
mandating or prohibiting sample retention,190 there exists no definitive 
standard for determining if or when retention is appropriate. 
Furthermore, the possibility of wrongful deprivation has been 
evidenced even in states whose statutes provide explicit guidance. For 
example, Wisconsin has failed to destroy a single DNA sample and, 
accordingly, has consistently violated its own law prohibiting sample 
 
 185. Id. at 335. 
 186. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 209. 
 187. Lombardo, supra note 20, at 589. 
 188. See Heather Hodges, Dean v. The District of Columbia: Goin’ to the Chapel and We’re 
Gonna Get Married, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 93, 126 (1996) (noting that the Court has 
conducted more exacting reviews of policies that discriminate on the basis of immutable traits 
with a “genetic origin”); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973):  
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined 
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members 
of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual 
responsibility.”  
(quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)); Dean v. District of 
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“If homosexuality has a genetic origin, like race 
or gender, any court . . . would have to be sympathetic to arguments that any statute forbidding 
same-sex marriage should be subject to ‘strict,’ or at least ‘intermediate,’ scrutiny.”).  
 189. Hodges, supra note 188, at 126.  
 190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
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retention.191 The continued retention of these samples wrongfully 
deprives individuals of their statutory right to have the samples 
destroyed. It also evidences the risk of future erroneous deprivations. 
Finally, courts have recognized that the government’s interest 
includes both its substantive interest in the property that it seeks and 
its interest in avoiding potential administrative burdens related to 
implementation of predeprivation procedures.192 In the situation at 
issue in this Note, there is little “substance” to the government’s 
substantive interest. Once a DNA profile is created from a DNA 
sample, the sample has no further use in criminal investigation or 
prosecution.193 Thus, the government’s interest in law enforcement 
depends only on retaining the profile. Absent sufficiently justifiable 
governmental interests, an innocent individual’s right to due process 
survives even if predeprivation proceedings are “impracticable, 
unrealistic, and . . . burden[some]” for the government.194 
Although due process may be flexible and require only those 
procedural protections that a particular situation demands,195 the 
Mathews test confirms that the government must provide some 
measure of procedural protection before depriving individuals of 
their DNA samples. The exact determination of the parameters of 
such procedures is more appropriately left to future in-depth analysis. 
An analysis invoking the second protective mechanism of the 
Due Process Clause—the substantive due process component—is 
perhaps more simple conceptually but, in its result, no more 
advantageous to the government. When the government has deprived 
individuals of their physical property, a substantive due process claim 
rests on evidence that the government’s decision to deprive the 
individuals of that property does not serve legitimate government 
interests.196 “The purpose of this requirement . . . . is to protect [an 
 
 191. Kimmelman, supra note 57, at 210. 
 192. See United States v. Real Property Known and Numbered as 429 S. Main St., New 
Lexington, Ohio, 52 F.3d 1416, 1420 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that, in part, the Mathews test 
considers “the Government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
additional procedural requirements would impose”).  
 193. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 194. Allen v. Leis, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1266 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see id. (“The Court answers 
this defense [that hearings are unduly burdensome] by . . . stating that, if the County Defendants 
are unwilling or unable to offer every pretrial detainee . . . due process . . . the County 
Defendants should wait until a conviction or plea of guilty is entered before assessing the Book-
in-Fee.”). 
 195. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
 196. Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old Versus New 
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individual’s] use and possession of property from arbitrary 
encroachment—to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken 
deprivations of property . . . .”197 Related directly to the government’s 
interest in crime investigation and prosecution is its decision to 
procure a sample, to retain the sample for a sufficiently lengthy time 
to create a profile, to create an actual profile, and to retain the 
profile. However, the decision to retain the sample after the creation 
of the profile in no way serves the government’s law enforcement 
interests.198 In this effect, the government’s decision to deprive an 
individual of property with no associated governmental benefit is, at 
best, incapable of serving “legitimate government interests” and, at 
worst, entirely “arbitrary.” 
Although the procedural and substantive analyses under the Due 
Process Clause likely provide sufficient grounds for preventing 
sample retention, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause offers an 
additional avenue of relief. 
B. The Takings Clause Affords Additional Protection against Sample 
Retention 
In appearance, the Takings Clause provides a right to the 
government by “allow[ing] government confiscation of private 
property so long as it is taken for a public use and just compensation 
is paid.”199 Conversely, of course, this constitutional mandate also 
protects the individual. To succeed on a takings claim, individuals 
must prevail in a three-part analysis that inquires whether a taking 
has occurred, whether property was taken for a public use, and 
whether just compensation was provided. Underlying these three 
steps, however, is the fundamental requirement that the item “taken” 
is the private property of an individual. Thus, the Takings Clause may 
be implicated as grounds for preventing DNA sample retention only 
by invoking the analysis presented in Part III of this Note.  
1. Identifying a Taking. The first prong of inquiry evaluates 
whether a taking of property has actually occurred.200 Imbedded in the 
 
Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2000). 
 197. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). 
 198. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 199. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 200. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426–27 (1982). 
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consideration of this question is a distinction between regulatory 
takings and physical occupations. If a government action is properly 
justified as regulatory, such that the action merely restricts the use of 
property, then the takings analysis requires a multifactor balancing 
test weighing the government’s interest, the scope of the restriction, 
and the resulting change in the property’s economic value.201 In 
contrast, a per se takings rule applies to situations involving the 
physical appropriation of property.202 Given that the retention of a 
DNA sample by law enforcement operates as a physical deprivation 
of property,203 it is situated within the confines of the per se rule. 
Despite the per se existence of a taking, the government action 
constituting that taking is nevertheless constitutional so long as the 
government effectuates the taking for public use204 and provides just 
compensation.205 
2. The Failure to Effectuate a Public Use. When the government 
retains a DNA sample—either permanently or for an extended 
period beyond the creation of a DNA profile—its action cannot 
appropriately be characterized as having been premised on public use 
theory. Undoubtedly, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,206 
premising the constitutional exercise of eminent domain on its 
rational relation to a conceivable public purpose, failed to establish a 
significant hurdle for proving public use. The Court has long 
recognized the legislature’s authority to define the public interest and, 
accordingly, to recognize a public purpose for a specific piece of 
legislation.207 It has further acknowledged that “the means of 
executing the project are for Congress and Congress alone to 
determine, once the public purpose has been established.”208 Hawaii 
Housing Authority granted identical deference to the decisions of a 
state legislature and recognized the “extremely narrow”209 “role for 
courts to play in reviewing . . . what constitutes a public use, even 
 
 201. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–26 (1978).  
 202. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435–36 (discussing the justifications underlying the traditional 
rule that a “permanent physical occupation of another’s property” constitutes a taking). 
 203. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
 204. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
 205. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. 
 206. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 207. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
 208. Id. at 33. 
 209. 467 U.S. at 240 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32). 
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when the eminent domain power is equated with the police power.”210  
A narrow role nonetheless remains a role. The Court in Hawaii 
Housing Authority was quick to defer to Hawaii’s stated interest in 
regulating oligopoly and concluded that it could not “condemn as 
irrational the Act’s approach to correcting the land oligopoly 
problem.”211 It deemed the constitutional requirement satisfied so 
long as the state “[l]egislature rationally could have believed that the 
[Act] would promote its objective.”212 
This approach demonstrates precisely why a state’s retention of a 
DNA sample does not meet the public use requirement of the 
Takings Clause. As just one example, the Alabama state legislature, 
in enacting a statute establishing a DNA database and identifying 
which genetic records could be retained in it, declared the database’s 
purposes to include “[a]ssisting federal, state, county, municipal, or 
local criminal justice and law enforcement officers or agencies in the 
putative identification, detection, or exclusion of persons who are the 
subjects of investigations or prosecutions.”213  
If the public purpose of DNA collection is to assist law 
enforcement investigation and prosecution, then the DNA sample is 
important only as the raw material from which a profile is created.214 
As discussed throughout this Note, the success of criminal 
investigation depends only on the profile; no additional law 
enforcement benefit derives from the retention of the physical 
sample. Law enforcement therefore effectuates a public use by 
retaining a sample until it can create a profile from that sample. After 
the creation of the profile, however, further retention of the sample in 
no way promotes the government’s stated interest.  
Although it is feasible that, at the advent of DNA technology, 
legislatures were unaware of this important distinction between the 
utility of samples and profiles, the state of current technology and 
scientific understanding renders it unlikely that a legislature could 
 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 242. 
 212. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981)). 
 213. ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (2001). The other purposes of the statute include human 
identification efforts and the development of forensic methods and DNA quality control 
standards. Id. 
 214. This conclusion applies with equal force to other purposes underlying DNA database 
statutes, such as those articulated by the Alabama state legislature. See supra note 213 and 
accompanying text.  
HARLAN FINAL.DOC 2/25/2005 2:31 PM 
218 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:179 
“rationally . . . believe[] that [sample retention] would promote its 
objective”215 of enhancing law enforcement efforts. Although 
significant in scope, this conclusion fits precisely within the 
“extremely narrow”216 bounds of a court’s ability to reject a 
legislature’s proclamation of public use. 
3. A Final Missing Link: The Absence of Just Compensation. If a 
court declines to find public use, the takings claim is successful and 
the government is prevented from securing the property. However, 
even if a court recognized a sufficient public use in sample retention, 
the government’s retention would remain unconstitutional unless the 
government provided “just compensation” to individuals.217 To 
proffer just compensation as a constitutional requirement is not to 
surmise that law enforcement would pay individuals for the right to 
store samples; rather, the inherent unlikelihood of such action itself 
serves as a sufficient restraint on the retention of samples. 
In its current approach, the government fails to issue just 
compensation to innocent individuals. The government has neither 
provided monetary remuneration218 nor conferred upon these 
individuals any benefits in kind. Although courts have recognized the 
sufficiency of benefits in kind—through the doctrine of “average 
reciprocity of advantage”219—arguments advocating such recognition 
with respect to the retention of innocents’ samples are inadequate. 
Drawing a parallel to the retention of DNA samples in a clinical 
forum, the weaknesses of an average reciprocity of advantage 
argument become evident. Within the medical therapy setting, 
samples are retained for diagnosis and treatment.220 In those 
 
 215. 467 U.S. at 242 (emphasis omitted) (quoting W. &. S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981)). 
 216. Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
 217. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 218. There is little discussion of monetary compensation for sample donation; even sources 
outlining comprehensive methods of sample procurement fail to mention financial 
remuneration for donation. See, e.g., Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 8, at 416 (“Officials can 
secure such samples in many ways. They can seek a court order . . . ; they can turn to a 
preexisting collection of DNA samples; they can take a sample with the consent of the 
individual; or they can try to locate a sample that the suspect has abandoned.”). 
 219. Blaine I. Green, The Endangered Species Act and Fifth Amendment Takings: 
Constitutional Limits of Species Protection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 329, 345 n.80 (1998). 
 220. See Gatter, supra note 83, at 441 (“Tissue removed . . . as part of a therapeutic 
operative procedure . . . is used primarily for therapy and diagnosis.”). 
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situations, benefits flow directly, individually, and uniquely to the 
donors.221 However, in the law enforcement realm, retained samples 
offer no direct, individual, or unique benefit to the individuals who 
provided them. Because individuals whose samples were collected 
through dragnet operations were never expressly suspected of having 
committed the crimes at issue, such innocent individuals fail to 
receive the benefit of exoneration from blame.222  
The Fifth Amendment takings and due process analyses provide 
new ammunition in the battle to protect innocent individuals’ DNA 
samples from government retention. Although the analyses outlined 
in this Note present only a partial review of the property-based 
protections offered by the Constitution, they serve as noteworthy 
examples of the protections made available by the recognition of a 
property interest in the DNA samples of innocent individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
Unique constitutional issues arise when law enforcement 
agencies retain DNA samples from innocent individuals targeted 
through dragnets. Traditional Fourth Amendment privacy analysis is 
no longer sufficient to protect the rights of these individuals; however, 
a property paradigm provides assurance of the Constitution’s ability 
to protect individuals. The application of property theories and 
jurisprudential property doctrines supports the recognition of a 
property right in the limited category of DNA samples discussed in 
this Note. This approach recognizes a DNA sample as the property of 
the individual donor and distinguishes between the DNA sample and 
a DNA profile created from the sample.  
The recognition of this limited property interest, and the 
resulting availability of constitutional protection, provides the most 
compelling defense against the retention of innocent individuals’ 
sensitive genetic information. Preventing the discrimination that 
might result from the availability of this information is, in itself, a 
significant goal. Yet, creating such protections is also a necessity for a 
society steeped in privacy but strapped by current laws ill-equipped to 
address advances in the beneficial use of DNA. 
 
 221. See id. at 442–43 (noting that consent requirements differ depending on whether the 
extracted tissue was procured for therapeutic reasons or nontherapeutic research purposes). 
 222. See Drobner, supra note 14, at 479–80 (explaining that dragnets are administered on 
the basis of class membership rather than individual suspicion). 
